Abstract: This lecture examines monetary policy during the past three decades. It documents two contrasting eras: first a Rules-Based Era from 1985 to 2003 and second an Ad Hoc Era from 2003 to the present. During the Rules-Based Era, monetary policy, in broad terms, followed a predictable systemic approach, and economic performance was generally good. During the Ad Hoc Era monetary policy is best described as a "discretion of authorities" approach, and economic performance was decidedly poor. By considering alternative explanations of this policy-performance correlation and examining corroborating evidence, the paper concludes that rules based policies have clear advantages over discretion.
authorizes instructed to follow the right policy at the right time for the right objective?" By empirically examining monetary policy during the seven decades from the founding of the Fed until around the time of his lecture, Friedman concluded that "the discretion of authorities" was severely deficient and recommended a predictable rules-based approach to monetary policy.
In this lecture I examine monetary policy during the period since Friedman gave that lecture. I show that during the first part of this period-I'll call it the Rules-Based Eramonetary policy, in broad terms followed a more predictable systemic approach, and economic performance improved dramatically. But during the second part of this period-the Ad Hoc Era-monetary policy returned to the "discretion of authorities" approach that Friedman warned about, and economic performance has been decidedly worse. My conclusion is thus much the same as Friedman's, but reinforced by two highly informative experiences.
The Rules-Based Era: 1985-2003
When assessing in practice whether monetary policy is rules-based, it is not necessary to focus on purely theoretical definitions of rules versus discretion-such as might come out of game theory or the time-inconsistency literature, where policy is at one extreme or the other.
Nor is it necessary to limit the definition of rules-based policy to situations where the policy instruments are set perfectly in line with an algebraic formula. Rather, the distinction between rules and discretion is more a matter of degree. There are several ways to assess and measure whether monetary policy is more rules-based or less rules-based.
When monetary policy is rules-based, decisions about the policy instruments are more predictable and more systematic. Policy makers can and do discuss their strategy in dynamic terms, including the implications of a decision today for decisions in the future. They tend to use formulas or equations for the policy instruments, at least as a guide when making decisions. And their decisions about the policy instruments can be described reasonably well by a stable relationship, which shows a consistent reaction of the policy instruments to observable events such as changes in inflation and real economic growth.
In contrast, in the case of more discretionary policy-making, decisions are less predictable and more ad hoc, and they tend to focus on short-term fine-tuning. Policymakers
show little interest in coming to agreement about an overall contingency strategy for setting the instruments of policy, and the historical paths for the instruments are not well described by stable algebraic relationships.
Using such considerations to assess policy, it is clear that American monetary policy started to became more rules-based starting in the early 1980s compared to earlier decades and especially compared to the decades immediately before. Maisel (1973) demonstrated in his memoirs that policy was extremely ad hoc, with little emphasis on strategy or systematic thinking. Policy got so bad that Fed Chairman Arthur Burns (1972) effectively gave up on using monetary policy as a means to achieve the goal of price stability and instead said he had to rely on wage and price controls, arguing that "wage rates and prices no longer respond as they once did to the play of market forces." One can show that the Fed's responses to events were erratic during this period in the sense that policy reaction functions were unstable empirically, as Andrew Levin and I (2012) showed for interest rate decisions.
A marked shift away from these discretionary policies occurred when Federal Reserve policy began to focus on price stability under the chairmanship of Paul Volcker which began in 1979. It was a dramatic change from the late 1960s and 1970s, enabling Volcker to say by 1983
that "We have…gone a long way toward changing the trends of the past decade and more." By the time Alan Greenspan took over as chairman in 1987 the commitment to the goal of price stability at the Federal Reserve was strong, and the FOMC was implementing a strategy for setting the instruments of policy to achieve this goal.
Although, at the time, commentators talked of a "Greenspan standard," suggesting a more ad hoc rather than systematic approach to policy, there is considerable evidence that a more rules based policy was being followed, at least compared with earlier periods. For example, Asso, Kahn, and Leeson (2010) studied the transcripts of the Federal Open Market Committee during this period, and they report a large number of references by committee members and the staff to monetary policy rules, at least as guides for decision making Additional evidence is found in the memoirs of Federal Reserve Board Governor Meyer (2004) who emphasized a systematic policy framework and provided a stark contrast with the memoirs of Governor Maisel (1973) .
Real-time statistical analyses at the Federal Reserve-from simple charts to econometric equations-provide some of the best quantitative measures of the degree to which policy became relatively rules-based in the 1980s. Consider Figure 1 , which is a reproduction of a chart originally produced in 1995 at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco by Judd and Trehan (1995) . It shows the actual federal funds rate and the interest rate recommended by a simple policy rule-in this case the Taylor rule (Taylor (1993) Other policy interventions were taken during the panic in late September and October 2008, including the Fed's programs to assist money market mutual funds and the commercial paper markets. Programs during the panic period are difficult to analyze empirically because so much was going on at the same time. In addition to the Fed's interventions, there was the FDIC guarantee of bank debt and then clarification that the TARP would be used for equity injections.
In the period following the panic, other interventions were introduced by the Fed, most significantly the Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) purchase program, which eventually turned out to be $1.25 trillion in size. This intervention, later dubbed Quantitative Easing I (QEI), was followed by massive purchases of medium and long term treasury debt, which was called QEII.
QEI and QEII were financed by massive expansions of the monetary base. Following QEII the Fed embarked on an "operation twist" in which it purchased long term Treasuries and sold short term Treasuries. Then in 2011 and 2012, it announced that the federal funds rate would most likely stay near zero through 2014. Clearly these policies were discretionary, ad hoc, and unpredictable, and cannot be described by a stable reaction function. Moreover, they have created legacies of monetary overhang-a greatly expanded Federal Reserve balance sheetwhich eventually needs to be run down which creates more uncertainty and unpredictability. And the actions do not constitute monetary policy as conventionally defined, but rather fiscal policy or credit allocation policy, which increases the likelihood of political interference and thus more unpredictability.
Economic Performance Compared: The Rules-Based Era and the Ad Hoc Era
The overall economic performance during these two monetary eras is vastly different-a fact which is well known but too rarely attributed to the vastly different monetary policy Much economic theory supports the more straightforward explanation that rules-based policy caused the improved performance. Economic models in which people are forwardlooking and take time to adjust their behavior imply that policy rules work better than discretion. Kydland and Prescott (1977) put forth the time inconsistency argument in favor of rules and
Robert Lucas (1976) shows that rules are essential for conducting and evaluating policy. 
Corroborating Evidence
There is also much evidence about specific policy actions. Modern monetary theory predicts that the Fed's focus on price stability and lower inflation-as occurred in the 1980s and 1990s-would not increase unemployment as old fashioned Phillips curves suggested. It also predicts that go-stop discretionary monetary policy causes booms and busts. When the Fed focused on price stability and largely ended its go-stop policy in the 1980s and 1990s, both predictions were borne out. Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes, and Krause (2006) showed that the change to a more rules-based monetary policy in the 1980s and 1990s was a factor in the improved economic performance.
Regarding the impact of specific discretionary policies, my empirical and simulation research (for example, Taylor (2007) ) shows that the low interest rates set by the Fed in [2003] [2004] [2005] added to the housing boom and led to risk taking and eventually a sharp increase in delinquencies, foreclosures, and toxic assets at financial institutions. The research also shows that a more rules-based federal funds rate would have prevented much of the boom and bust.
By now considerable additional empirical work supports the view that interest rates were too low for too long and that this was a factor in the boom and bust in housing. In a Bank of England study, Bean et al. (2010) argue that the low policy rates were a factor in the crisis, though only a "modest" factor. Like Jarocinski and Smets (2008), Bean et al. (2010) estimate a VAR. They use different variables, but they also find that policy rule deviations had an effect on housing prices; they find that 26 percent of the U.S. price increase was due to the low rates. In comparison, the bust in house prices following the peak of the boom was about 30 percent in the United States. Their "impulse response functions" show that the impact of the policy rule deviations on housing is significantly different from zero, and the Now consider the impact of the discretionary interventions that followed the too low for too long period which likely led to the financial crisis. For this purpose it is useful to divide the financial crisis into three phases as shown in Figure 4 : (1) Figure 6 shows the LIBOR-OIS spread during these three periods.
Figure 4. Three Phases of the Financial Crisis
My research on several of the extraordinary measures taken in the pre-panic is that they did not work, and that some were harmful. The Term Auction Facility (TAF) did little to reduce tension in the interbank markets during this period, as shown by Taylor and Williams (2009) , and it drew attention away from counterparty risks in the banking system. The unpredictable and extraordinary bailout measures, which began with Bear Stearns, were the most harmful in my view. The Bear Sterns actions led many to believe that the Fed's balance sheet would again be available in the case that another similar institution failed. But the Fed closed its balance sheet in the case of Lehman Brothers, and then reopened it again in the case of AIG. It was then closed off again for such bailouts and the TARP was proposed. Event studies reported in Taylor (2008) show that the roll out of the TARP coincided with the severe panic.
The on again/off again bailout policies of the Fed did not prevent the panic that began in The original stated purpose of the TARP-to buy up toxic assets on banks' balance sheets-was never credibly viewed as operational and it caused uncertainty. It was only when the purpose of TARP was changed and clarified on October 13, 2008 to inject equity into the banks that the panic subsided.
The panic period is the most complex to analyze because the Fed's main measures during this period-those designed to deal with problems in the money market mutual fund and the commercial paper markets-were intertwined with the FDIC bank debt guarantees and the clarification that the TARP would be used for equity injections, which was a major reason for the halt in the panic. A detailed examination of micro data by Duygan-Bumpt et al. (2010) shows that the Fed's asset backed commercial paper money market mutual fund liquidity facility (AMLF) was effective. And the Federal Reserve should also be given credit for rebuilding confidence by quickly starting up these complex programs from scratch in a turbulent period and for working closely with central banks abroad in setting up swap lines.
Now consider the post panic period starting with the large-scale asset purchase programs, QEI and QEII. Evaluations reported by the Fed concluded that the asset purchases were effective. However, most of these studies, such as Gagnon et al. (2010) , are based on "announcement effects" which can be quite misleading. If one looks at the programs themselves-at the amount purchased and the timing-the conclusions are quite different.
For example, consider the impact of the Fed's mortgage backed securities (MBS) purchase program, which at $1.25 trillion is the largest single program. My research on that program with based on Johannes Stroebel is that the MBS program had a rather small and uncertain effect on mortgage rates once one controls for prepayment risk and default risk. Whether or not one believes that these discretionary interventions worked, their consequences going forward are negative. First, they raise questions about central bank independence. The programs are not monetary policy as conventionally defined, but rather fiscal policy or credit allocation policy because they try to help some firms or sectors and not others and are financed through money creation rather than taxes or public borrowing. Unlike monetary policy, there is no established rationale that such policies should be run by an independent agency of government. By taking these extraordinary measures, the Fed has risked losing its independence over monetary policy.
A second negative consequence of the programs is that unwinding them involves considerable risks. In order to unwind the programs in the current situation, for example, the Fed must reduce the size of its MBS portfolio and reduce reserve balances. But there is uncertainty about how much impact the purchases have had on mortgage interest rates, and thus there is uncertainty about how much mortgage interest rates will rise as the MBS are sold. There is also uncertainty and disagreement about why banks are holding so many excess reserves now. If the current level of reserves represents the amount banks desire to hold, then reducing reserves could cause a further reduction in bank lending.
A third negative consequence is the risk of inflation. If the Fed finds it politically difficult to reduce the size of the balance sheet as the economy recovers and as public debt increases, then inflationary pressures will undoubtedly increase.
Some argue that the Fed needs to introduce even more discretion. One proposal is to introduce new countercyclical instruments such as pro-cyclical capital buffers. These new instruments would work along with the interest rate instrument of monetary policy to cool credit or asset price booms. Unfortunately there has been very little analytical or empirical work on this subject, and I do not see evidence that such instruments are needed. Yes, capital requirements should be higher and commensurate with the risk that a financial institution takes; and effective supervision and regulation is essential.
However, the rationale for discretionary changes in capital requirements to attenuate booms is based on the view that simply keeping the interest rate instrument from deviating from the policy rules approach of the 1980s and 1990s would not have prevented the worst of the housing boom. If one believes that low policy rates were a large factor in the recent boom and the bust leading to the crisis, then there is still much that one can do with the interest rate instrument before using these alternatives.
Another proposed change which would require more discretion would be to do more to burst bubbles before they get out of hand. But we know little about identifying bubbles let alone popping them without causing more harm than good. A higher priority for monetary policy in the future is to avoid causing the bubbles in the first place. The successful policy during the RulesBase Era did not include such attempts to pop bubbles and the economy functioned very well.
Yet another proposed deviation from a policy rule framework would have central banks temporarily raise inflation targets. The reason is that with a two percent target in policy rules the interest rate would have to go negative in a severe crisis. But in the current crisis, the Taylor rule had interest rates going close to zero and remaining there for a while, but not going significantly negative. Moreover, raising inflation targets could easily reduce credibility about an inflation target at all, further damaging central bank credibility.
Although the basic policy rule framework is still sound, the crisis does reveal some he need to improve international aspects of monetary policy. around by large amounts.
The Need to Exit
For all the reasons given in this lecture, it is crucial to announce a clear and predictable exit strategy and get back to rules based policy. I have outlined such a strategy in Taylor (2009) .
By definition an exit strategy is a policy describing how the instruments will be adjusted over time until the normal monetary rule framework is reached. It is analogous to a policy rule for the interest rate in a monetary framework except that it also describes the level of reserves and the composition of the balance sheet of the central bank.
How would such an exit rule work? One possibility would be to link the Fed's decisions about the interest rate with its decisions about the level of bank reserves held at the Fed. When the Fed decides to start increasing the federal funds rate target, it would also reduce reserve balances. One reasonable exit strategy for Fed would reduce reserve balances by specific amount for each 25 basis point increase in the federal funds rate. The goal should be to have reserves near the level needed for supply and demand equilibrium in the money market by the time the interest rate hits 2 percent, which was where it was when the balance sheet started to explode as the Fed started increasing reserves in the fall of 2008. The funds rate fell from 2 percent to 0 percent as the Fed increased the supply of reserves. An attractive feature of this exit strategy is that the Fed would exit unorthodoxy at the same 2 percent interest rate as it entered unorthodoxy.
Conclusion
The purpose of this lecture has been to examine and learn from broad trends in monetary policy in the three decades since Milton Friedman (1982) 
